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The paper concerns the role of intentionality in reasoning about wrong doing.
Anthropologists have claimed that, in certain non-Western societies, people ignore
whether an act of wrong doing is committed intentionally or accidentally. To examine this
proposition, we look at the case of Madagascar. We start by analyzing how Malagasy
people respond to incest, and we find that in this case they do not seem to take
intentionality into account: catastrophic consequences follow even if those who commit
incest are not aware that they are related as kin; punishment befalls on innocent people;
and the whole community is responsible for repairing the damage. However, by looking
at how people reason about other types of wrong doing, we show that the role of
intentionality is well understood, and that in fact this is so even in the case of incest.
We therefore argue that, when people contemplate incest and its consequences, they
simultaneously consider two quite different issues: the issue of intentionality and blame,
and the much more troubling and dumbfounding issue of what society would be like if
incest were to be permitted. This entails such a fundamental attack on kinship and on the
very basis of society that issues of intentionality and blame become irrelevant. Using the
insights we derive from this Malagasy case study, we re-examine the results of Haidt’s
psychological experiment on moral dumbfoundedness, which uses a story about incest
between siblings as one of its test scenarios. We suggest that the dumbfoundedness
that was documented among North American students may be explained by the same
kind of complexity that we found in Madagascar. In light of this, we discuss the
methodological limitations of experimental protocols, which are unable to grasp multiple
levels of response. We also note the limitations of anthropological methods and the
benefits of closer cross-disciplinary collaboration.
Keywords: intentionality, incest, morality, causal cognition, anthropology, Madagascar
INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the role that intentionality plays in causal
reasoning and, more particularly, in reasoning about, and
responding to, acts of wrong doing. In the modern Western
legal tradition and in Western folk thinking more generally, a
sharp distinction is drawn between doing wrong intentionally
and doing wrong through negligence or accident. For example,
the English legal code considers murder and man-slaughter to
be quite different and to merit an altogether different pun-
ishment. Although this distinction is often taken to be uni-
versal, some recent anthropological findings have challenged
this assumption, showing that in some cultural contexts people
only care about the effects of an action, not about the inten-
tions behind it (or lack thereof; e.g., Danziger, 2006; Walker,
2015).
In this paper, we shall explore the proposition that consider-
ations of intentionality are not a universal component of causal
reasoning about wrong doing, by looking at an ethnographic case
we are familiar with: the case of Madagascar. In the last part
of the paper, we use our ethnographically specific conclusions
on intentionality to reconsider some classic work in the social
psychology of morality.
Before proceeding, a few clarifications about terminology and
methodology are in order. By intentionality we mean “having the
intention to act in a certain way or to cause a certain outcome,” as
opposed to accidentally doing so. By causal cognition we mean the
folk understandings of what causes certain events to take place.
In the case of actions understood to be brought about by people,
causal cognition concerns the understanding of the link between
the actor and her acts. By reasoning about wrong doing we mean
the assessment by members of a community of what caused the
wrongdoing and what to do about it.
Regarding the methodology, what follows is based on our
long-term ethnographic fieldwork in three different regions of
Madagascar: Astuti, among the Vezo on the Western coast; Bloch,
among the Merina and the Zafimaniry of the central highlands.
Although there are significant differences between these pop-
ulations with regards to their livelihoods, their relation to the
state, their kinship system, and much more, in this paper we
draw on ethnographic evidence that is equally valid across our
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field sites and, for ease of exposition, we refer to Madagascar
and the Malagasy people in an undifferentiated manner (for
the purpose of the present discussion, “people” refers to adults,
men and women alike). Ethnographic fieldwork is based on the
long-term engagement with communities of people who allow
the anthropologist into their lives; the evidence it generates is
gleaned through the gradual transformative process by which the
anthropologist learns to move, speak, eat, sleep, dance, trade,
fish, plant, tend animals, attend births and funerals, and so on,
competently, as if she was a member of that community (for more
details, see, e.g., Bloch, 1992; Astuti, 1995). This apprenticeship
is aided by observation, participation, and by asking questions.
With reference to the specific topic of this paper, we derive our
conclusions from having learnt ourselves how to live morally in
these communities, from having witnessed moral outrage or anx-
iety, from having asked explanations for decisions already made
or for predictions of future behavior, and from having engaged
people informally in counterfactual reasoning and other thought
experiments in the course of our everyday interactions with them.
This methodology yields in-depth and diffused knowledge, which
cannot be quantified or statistically analyzed.
INCEST
For reasons that will become clear, we start with the case of incest.
The definition of what counts as incest varies across Mada-
gascar. In some parts of the island, the children of two brothers
can marry, while this would be regarded as an incestuous union
elsewhere. People are aware of these differences; but they are also
aware that all Malagasy people, in so far as they are “people” and
not “animals,” have a taboo against at least some sexual unions
among kinspeople. Breaching this taboo causes terrible things to
happen: crops fail, canoes overturn at sea, children die, women’s
fertility dries up, infants are born with horns on their heads or
humps on their backs.
Such catastrophic consequences unfold irrespective of whether
the people who committed incest did so knowingly and intention-
ally. In cases of distant incest (for example, when the genealogical
relation goes back three or four generations), the people involved
may have no idea that they are related, hence that they are
committing incest. In such cases, it is the misfortune that follows
which reveals that, in fact, the incest taboo has been breached.
Indeed, the severity of the breach is not calculated a priori by strict
genealogical reckoning, but post facto by observing the extent of
the harm that befalls the community and the significance of the
atonement that is needed to put things right.
Similarly, in the course of informal conversations about incest,
we told a couple of our Malagasy interlocutors a story about two
siblings who get separated at birth and, later in life, meet and end
up liking and having sex with each other. The judgment was that
the two people are not at fault because they do not know that they
are brother and sister; nonetheless, their act will cause terrible
misfortune on their children and on their families. Notably, the
fact that a large number of innocent people are expected to
be affected by the wrongdoing of the culprits, underscores the
conclusion that intentionality does not mediate between the cause
(incest) and its effects (harm). Correspondingly, a large number
of innocent people are responsible for undertaking the difficult
(expensive, dangerous, stressful) ritual work that is required to
repair the damage and put things right again.
All in all, it seems that when the Malagasy people we know
reason about incest, predict and act upon its consequences, con-
siderations of intentionality are simply beside the point. This is
shown in three ways: first, harm follows irrespective of whether
people are aware that they are breaching the incest taboo; second,
harm befalls on people who have not themselves committed
incest; third, the costs of ritual reparation befall on large numbers
of innocent people. Incest, therefore, is prima facie a perfect
endorsement of the claim that considerations of intentionality
are not a universal component of causal reasoning about wrong
doing.
MUNDANE ACTS OF WRONG DOING
One might be tempted to conclude that Malagasy adults do not
distinguish between intentional and accidental acts of wrong
doing. This conclusion, however, is unsupported by evidence that
comes from other contexts of social life, where the distinction
between wrong doing that is committed intentionally and wrong
doing that happens accidentally is clearly drawn and taken into
account.
To tease out this distinction, we asked a few of our informants
whether the punishment that follows an intentional act of mild
aggression (kicking over somebody’s bucket of water) as opposed
to an accidental one (stumbling over somebody’s bucket of water)
is equivalent or different. In the discussions that were sparked
by this hypothetical scenario, people reasoned that if the bucket
gets broken, the person will have to replace it in both cases. But
the process by which this happens will be very different: if it
was an accident, the person will say sorry and will volunteer to
replace the bucket, explaining that she did not see it; if it was
an intentional act, a fight will ensue and the victim will take
the perpetrator to the village assembly, where a more serious
punishment might be dispensed (e.g., a monetary compensation
in addition to the replaced bucket). In a different conversation,
the following scenarios were presented: two neighbors own two
identical chickens. In one scenario, one of them accidentally kills
the chicken that belongs to the other person, while in the other
scenario, the killing of the other person’s chicken happens know-
ingly and intentionally. When asked what would happen if the two
cases were brought to the village assembly, our interlocutors said
that in the case of the first (unintentional) killing, there would be
no reason to go to the village assembly and that there would be no
punishment either. The person who made the mistake would say
sorry and give her chicken to the other and that would be the end
of the story.
In such mundane cases, intentionality thus matters a great
deal. This does not mean that the distinction between intentional
and accidental wrongdoing can always be drawn with clarity:
people can say that they did not see the bucket they stumbled
over or that they did not know that the chicken they killed was
not theirs, while in reality they saw the bucket and knew that
the chicken was their neighbor’s. In other words, people can
lie about their state of knowledge and about their intentions.
But this uncertainty does not invalidate the distinction between
intentional and accidental causality.
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ANCESTRAL TABOOS
Somewhere in between the case of incest—where intentionality
seems to be beside the point—and the case of mundane acts
of wrongdoing—where the distinction between intentional and
accidental acts is paramount—there is the case of the breach of
ancestral taboos.
Across Madagascar, people inherit a host of taboos from their
ancestors, which determine which food they cannot eat, which
animals they cannot kill, which words they cannot speak, which
trees they cannot cut down, which color they cannot wear, and
so on. As discussed at length elsewhere (Astuti, 2007a), adults
are aware that the only, but fundamentally moral, reason people
follow ancestral taboos is to show respect to their ancestors, who
are the true source of their being. There is nothing inherently
wrong in eating chicken or pork (whereas there is something
inherently wrong in committing incest); what is wrong is to dis-
obey one’s ancestors who have stipulated—for whatever reason—
that chicken or pork is forbidden.
Against this background, what difference does it make whether
people breach a taboo intentionally or accidentally? The evidence
on this is ambiguous, and interestingly so. On the one hand,
some taboos work in a mechanistic fashion that seems to by-pass
the intentions of the taboo violator. Take the following example:
there are ancestral taboos that proscribe certain behaviors at
sea, especially in the pursuit of the highly prized sea-turtle. The
consequence of breaching one of these taboos is the failure to
catch a sea-turtle ever again. This punishment, however, does
not befall on the individual who breached the taboo, but on
the canoe that carried that individual to sea (whether or not
he is the owner of the canoe). The fact that the punishment is
dispatched to the canoe (an artifact which is said to “breathe,” as it
gently and rhythmically responds to the pressure of the waves, but
which is not attributed a mind/spirit) suggests that the intentions,
the knowledge or the ignorance of the wrongdoer is simply
irrelevant.
But this conclusion does not go unchallenged. Consider the
fact that young children do not suffer any consequence if they
breach an ancestral taboo. This is because, being still “unwise”
and lacking any understanding (this is how adults describe them),
they do not know what taboos are, why it is important to follow
them, how disrespectful it is to disobey the ancestors, and so on.
As a result, because of the immature state of their minds, it is as
if their taboos did not yet exist. This does not mean that children
are never victims of ancestral punishment; they are, but as a result
of their parents’ and elders’ wrongdoing.
The same point—that breaching a taboo is of consequence
only if it is done knowingly and intentionally—emerges from the
result of the following study (described in Astuti, unpublished).
Fifteen adult participants were told a story in which an infant is
found abandoned in the forest and is raised by people who know
nothing about his birth origins; they were then asked: will the
taboos of this child’s birth parents (specifically, the taboo against
eating pork or chicken) affect the child when he grows up or not?
The overwhelming majority of adults (80%) responded that the
child will not be affected by the taboo. They explained that the
birth father’s taboo has been lost and that it will not work on
the child because he does not know about it. Only the remaining
handful of participants reasoned otherwise and suggested that
when the child will eventually, if unknowingly, eat the food that
was taboo for his birth father, he will become ill or crazy. The
existence of the taboo will then “come out” and will be seen and
explained by a diviner. In other words, the unintentional breach
of a food taboo caused something like an allergic reaction—
mechanically and irrespective of anyone’s intentions. But this was
a minority view.
ANOTHER LOOK AT INCEST
We have established that, when reasoning about acts of wrong
doing and when considering what actions might follow (e.g.,
reparation, punishment, mediation), the Malagasy people we have
worked with take into account whether such acts were undertaken
intentionally or not. This finding forces us to ask why, then,
intentionality does not seem to be taken into account in the case of
incest. We will explore this question through two complementary
moves: first ethnographically and then by way of a more theoreti-
cal reflection, which generates a testable hypothesis.
The word that Malagasy adults will almost certainly always use
when discussing incest and contemplating its effects, is loza. The
dictionary definition of this term is “calamity” or “disaster”; the
verb for committing incest (mandoza) thus literally translates as
causing a calamity or a disaster. This terminology expresses quite
starkly the horror of incest: that incest causes everything to go
wrong; that, in Hamlet’s words, when incest occurs “the time is
out of joint” (see Wolf, 2014, p. 77 ff. for a range of ethnographic
examples that express a similar sentiment).
As mentioned earlier, the consequences of incest are indeed
understood as catastrophic: people’s livelihood, health, and repro-
duction are threatened. And yet, when asked why this is so, our
Malagasy interlocutors are stumped—or dumbfounded, to use
a term used in the psychological literature on moral reasoning
(e.g., Haidt et al., unpublished; Haidt, 2001). In other words,
they are unable to give a single and sufficient account of the
relationship between cause (the breach of the taboo) and effect
(loza). Instead, they come up with a multitude of answers that
restate the necessity of the taboo and which do not satisfactorily
explain (either for them or for us) the enormity of what incest
brings about.
To try to understand the source of our informants’ dumb-
foundedness, we turn to a theoretical discussion of the nature
of human sociality. As argued elsewhere by Bloch (2008), among
humans the social is fundamentally different from what it is
among other primates. In the case of the latter, social roles are
only perceived as existing in the here and now, and only so long
as the individuals who fill them are capable of maintaining their
position. Among humans, by contrast, social roles have a kind of
imaginary existence that extends beyond the here and now: roles
survive their incumbents; they extend beyond the life cycle, the
frailty, the shortcomings of any one individual that inhabits them.
In other words, they are experienced as having transcendental
permanence. This, Bloch argues, is the result of the uniquely
human capacity for imagination (see also Rakoczy, 2008; Wyman
and Rakoczy, 2011, for a cognate point).
In the kind of Malagasy communities where we work, kinship
and its roles—ancestor, elder, father, mother, mother’s brother,
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wife, husband, father- and mother in-law, son- and daughter-in-
law, son, daughter, grandchild, and so on—are experienced as
this form of transcendental sociality. Kinship is transcendental
because it extends back in time and is projected into the future,
thus seeming to involve a kind of unquestionable permanence
beyond the biological lives of those who fill specific kinship roles
at any one time; it is transcendental because its extension and
temporal reach negate the experience of the fluidity of life in the
here and now, even though such extension and temporal reach can
only be experienced in the imagination and during circumscribed
ritual acts that produce vivid snapshots of the transcendental
order; and it is transcendental because, irrespective of who he
might be as an individual (poor, weak, unsuccessful, mean-
spirited) a father-in-law is a father-in-law, who deserves respect
and deference from his son-in-law (who might be wealthier,
stronger, more successful and deeply resentful).
Ordinary life in Malagasy villages is not experienced only
through this transcendental sociality. The now-on-now-off tem-
porality of human life is fully recognized: how could it not be
when people see babies turn into adults and adults turn into
lifeless bodies; people’s non-transcendental personalities matter:
they please and annoy in the same measure; the fickleness of
kinship relations is an ever ending topic of conversation: despite
being a kin, she did not behave in kin-like fashion. And yet, even
though kinship in its transcendental form appears to negate one’s
daily experience, it also appears to be essential to people’s very
existence—“if people are people,” as our Malagasy informants
would put it, they have to have a permanent system of kinship that
extends through time and that slots people into roles that have
permanence and fixity. By transcending the fluid, largely unpre-
dictable interactions that make up everyday life, transcendental
kinship provides an image, however vague, of a stable and lasting
order and seems to afford certainty about what people ought to do
and how they should behave—as mothers and fathers, as children
and grandchildren.
This is why incest leaves people dumbfounded: it is because
incest is felt to attack the foundational principles of kinship and,
by attacking kinship at its foundation, it is felt to threaten the
transcendental in its entirety. In ethnographic terms, as we have
seen, incest is said to cause loza: calamity and disaster. In more
abstract and theoretical terms, we now propose, incest is perceived
as a threat to the very fabric of human sociality. This is because the
possibility of incest evokes a world where everything and anything
is allowed; a world where there are no rules, no respect for elders
or for ancestors, who are the source of one’s own existence. Note
the difference between the breach of the incest taboo and the
breach of ancestral taboos: as we noted above, ancestral taboos
are the result of decisions made by one’s ancestors (e.g., that
we should not eat pork). There is nothing dumbfounding about
the prospect of breaching one of these taboos, because doing so
amounts to a single act of disobedience (indeed, if one manages
to get away with it, such disobedience can be experienced as
enjoyable and liberating). What would be dumbfounding for
our informants is the prospect of breaching all ancestral taboos
in an act of collective defiance, thus defying the fundamental
principle of age hierarchy. As with incest, such a scenario would
amount to a wholesale attack on kinship, which would cause
generalized loza and would question the very humanity of those
concerned.
Returning to incest: at issue is not so much who can and
cannot have sex with whom, or how incest should be punished;
at issue is the much more fundamental question of whether any
rule at all is legitimate. The very fact that incest can occur seems
to invite the thought that the rules we live by may be just flimsy
fictions; that, perhaps, the incest taboo and the marriage rules that
ensure its avoidance are just a convention. Indeed, the possibility
of such a challenge seems to be implicit in the recognition that
people in different parts of Madagascar have different definitions
of what counts as incest. This line of reasoning is dumbfounding
because, if one starts to ask these kinds of questions, social life
begins to unravel and nothing is safe.1
From this perspective—that of the possibility of incest as a
total attack on the social—we can understand (and could have
predicted) all the three ways we mentioned earlier in which
intentionality is bypassed: it makes sense that, if incest occurs,
harm will follow irrespective of whether it was committed inten-
tionally or not; it makes sense that the catastrophic consequences
of incest will affect everyone; and it makes sense that everyone
is responsible for trying to put the world back together again.
From this perspective, we can expect intentionality to become
irrelevant because the breach is too enormous, the consequences
too shattering, the repair work too essential.2
ANOTHER LOOK AT INTENTIONALITY
We have argued that, although our Malagasy informants take
intentionality into account when considering acts of wrong doing,
its relevance seems to fade away when incest is concerned, because
of incest’s cosmic consequences.
We now need to qualify our argument, by recognizing that
intentionality can play a role in people’s reasoning about incest.
Across Madagascar, it is the elders’ responsibility to make young
people aware of the individuals they are in a taboo relationship
with. As soon as children reach the age when they are deemed
to be interested in sex, they will be told: those people, they are
taboo to you. What, then, if these young people intentionally
disregard what they have been told and start up an incestuous
relationship? When people envisage this possibility, they pass
strong judgment on the irresponsibility of those youngsters who
knowingly disregard the warnings of their elders to indulge the
attraction they feel for one another. Somewhat predictably, today’s
youths are deemed to be more selfish and immoral than those of
the past; they are accused of breaching basic taboos that would
1There is an obvious similarity between our analysis and Lévi-Strauss’s argu-
ment about incest—that the incest prohibition is the foundation of human
society, which marked the transition from nature to culture. We need not
follow him in the evolutionary dimension of his argument. But we note
that in societies where kinship provides the overwhelming experience of the
transcendental, people do feel that if incest were allowed to occur, then human
society would collapse. Life would not be human life any longer.
2Note that our analysis does not exclude the possibility that humans have
evolved a natural aversion toward incest: see Wolf (2014) for a recent elabora-
tion of this argument; in and of itself, such a natural aversion does not explain
what we are trying to explain, that is, why the intentionality of the wrong-doer
is not relevant when reasoning about incest.
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ensure that brothers and sisters (anyone who is referred by these
terms in the expansive web of classificatory kinship) do not come
into any kind of sexually inflected association with one another.
For example, it is bad enough that girls nowadays wear trousers,
which expose their groin to their male kin, but it is shocking
that a brother and a sister should share the very same garment.
When people discuss such cases, they express a sense of outrage,
along the lines: “what do they think they are doing, behaving
like that?” As people express these worries, they focus on the
deliberate, intentional disregard for the rules that are meant to
protect people, young and old.
Another common trope is that, if a couple is found to have
committed incest, whether knowingly or unknowingly, they will
be asked to immediately separate and bring their relationship
to an end. But what do youngsters do nowadays? They will
retort that, if forced to separate, they will commit suicide. Their
stubbornness is deemed unreasonable and particularly wicked,
because they selfishly and intentionally force on their families an
impossible choice: to cause their children to take their own life or
to condone their incestuous relationship.
Whether wrong doing is done intentionally or not can thus
be taken into account even in the case of incest. But the point is
that attributing blame is a quite different concern than imagining
a world without any incest rule, where what is experienced as
necessary for one’s collective existence as human beings is under
threat. Attributing blame, in other words, is a quite different
matter than dealing with loza.
CAUSAL COGNITION AND INTENTIONALITY
Through the analysis of our data from Madagascar, we have made
the following arguments: that the way people reason about, and
respond to, incest is, prima facie, an example of causal reasoning
being decoupled from intentionality; nonetheless, this does not
warrant the conclusion that Malagasy people have a radically
different form of causal cognition that is blind to intentionality;
evidence that intentionality is taken into account comes from the
way people handle mundane forms of wrong doing as well as the
breach of a host of ancestral taboos; indeed, we have also shown
that considerations of intentionality are present in the way people
assess culpability even in the case of incest.
What the discussion above shows is that, when talking about,
and taking actions in response to incest, our informants may be
thinking about two quite different kinds of thing: they may be
deliberating about who did what and who should be blamed, and
they may be evoking the catastrophic image of a world where
incest is permitted. In the first instance intentionality is relevant,
whereas in the second instance it is not. Our hypothesis—which
can be tested cross-culturally—is that both of these responses are
going to be present whenever people respond to incest: on the one
hand, they will engage their everyday causal reasoning, while on
the other hand they will be dumbfounded by the attack on the
transcendental that incest instantiates.
Anthropologists, who study talk and action within lived con-
texts, are in a position, if they are so minded, to distinguish
between these two responses. Because, at the back of their minds,
they have a myriad of practices and discourses from their long
term experience of sharing the life of the people they study,
they can recognize when people switch, from instant to instant,
from one type of discourse to the other. They might be able to
distinguish between the two even when people, as they often do,
draw on the two simultaneously. This is what we have shown
in this paper, demonstrating the kind of understanding that
anthropologists are positioned to contribute, as they observe and
participate in the contexts where people reflect, talk and act jointly
with others.
This kind of understanding, by contrast, is not easily generated
by the methods typically used by psychologists. Such methods
proceed by deliberately isolating subjects in controlled experi-
mental settings, placing them outside any actual lived social con-
text. Without the wider social context in which their experimental
subjects think and act, psychologists are at risk of not actually
understanding what their subjects say and do in the conduct of the
experiment. In the next and final section, we illustrate this point
with reference to a most famous case of moral dumbfoundedness.
MORAL DUMFOUNDEDNESS RE-EXAMINED
In an influential paper, Haidt and two of his co-researchers (Haidt
et al., unpublished manuscript) reported the results of an experi-
ment with undergraduates from the University of Virginia, which
became the cornerstone of Haidt’s (2001) “social intuitionist
model of moral judgment.”
Briefly, students were told three different stories that called
for a moral judgment (on whether the action depicted in the
story was wrong) and they were presented with two situations
that called for an action (which they could accept or refuse to
undertake). One of the stories was the so called Heinz dilemma,
which pitted the wrongness of theft against the necessity to save
the life of one’s loved one. The expectation was that, in this
case, participants would engage in dispassionate moral reasoning,
evaluating the pros and cons of the two possible courses of action.
By contrast, in the case of the other two stories—one about incest
between brother and sister and the other about cannibalism—and
in the case of the two actions—drinking from a glass of juice after
a perfectly sterilized cockroach was dipped into it and signing off
to the experimenter one’s soul after one’s death—the expectation
was that participants would have a strong moral intuition that the
action was wrong (which they did) and a strong rejection of the
proposed actions (which they had), but that they would be unable
to explain why. In other words, the prediction was that they would
be morally dumbfounded.
The stories about incest and cannibalism were written to
pre-empt and counteract the usual objections to such acts. For
example, the story about incest said that the siblings took abso-
lutely reliable precautions against the possibility of pregnancy;
that they had sex in secret and that they never mentioned it to
anyone else; that after the act, which they enjoyed, they decide
not to do it again and that they went on to live very happy
lives, feeling even closer to one another. Having judged that it
was wrong for the brother and sister to have sex, the students
proved unable to explain why this was so. They offered all the
predicted standard arguments: the fact that the brother and sister
might give birth to a deformed child; the fact that their act
might offend the sensibilities of other people; the fact that the act
would be detrimental to their long term relationship and their
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psychological well-being. Of course, all of these reasons had been
ruled out by the story, and the experimenter, playing his scripted
role as “devil’s advocate,” told them so. And yet, the students came
back, again and again, trying to find new arguments, exploring
what they soon recognized were “dead ends,” admitting that they
did not know, that they could not explain (i.e., that they were
dumbfounded), all the while growing increasingly frustrated, as
evidenced by their facial expressions, their fidgeting behavior,
nervous laughter and the like.
The interpretation of the students’ dumbfoundedness (which
was also in evidence in the case of cannibalism and in the response
to the two proposed actions, but which was absent in the case
of the Heinz dilemma) was that, in responding to these specific
scenarios, the students were guided by their emotions, their “gut
feeling” that certain behaviors and actions were just wrong. Hav-
ing made an intuitive, emotional judgment, they later searched,
unsuccessfully, for some rational justification. Following Hume’s
non-rationalist tradition, Haidt’s “social intuitionist model” thus
posits that “moral judgment is caused by quick moral intuitions
and is followed (when needed) by slow, ex post facto moral
reasoning” (Haidt, 2001, p. 817).
We want to propose an alternative to this conclusion and
to Haidt’s explanation of dumbfoundedness—an unquestionably
real phenomenon—on the basis of our experience as anthro-
pologists. Often enough, in the course of fieldwork, we witness
our informants’ dumbfoundedness: they are unable to produce
answers to our questions concerning why something is right or
wrong, why they do what they do, or why they believe what they
assert. It is thus very easy for us to imagine that our Malagasy
informants, faced by the experimental situation that Haidt pre-
sented to his American subjects, would behave in very similar
fashion. Taking the example of incest: they too would maintain
that incest is very wrong, and they would continue to do so even
if all the specific reasons they might come up with to explain why
have been discounted one by one. They too might start fidgeting
and grow frustrated, and might politely tell us that they do not
know why, but that they know that it is so. However, in light of
our ethnographic evidence and the analysis we have developed in
this paper, we are wary of attributing their dumbfoundedness to
the role of their emotional intuitions.
One thing we have learnt as anthropologists is that the first
and most important step in any investigation is to interrogate
whether the questions one asks are hitting the point, namely
whether they address the issue one is investigating in a way that
genuinely touches on the concerns of one’s interlocutors—even
when, apparently, everyone is using the very same words. For
example, one might want to question what it would actually mean
to ask our Malagasy informants whether it is wrong for Julie and
Mark—the sister and brother of Haidt’s experimental story—to
have sex. Asked in this way, the question is about two individuals
making a decision and acting in isolation. But while we are busy
asking about Julie and Mark and recording the answers and the
scrambling for some kind of justification, our informants might
be thinking about something entirely different. They might be
contemplating more profound and much more dumbfounding
questions, lurking behind the question about Julie and Mark. The
questions would be: what kind of society would this be where
brothers and sisters can have sex? A society, a kinship and a family
system where incest is acceptable? How could one live in such a
place? The way our Malagasy informants would apprehend and
respond to these questions is through the readily available concept
of loza which, as we have argued above, evokes a state of complete
social catastrophe caused by an outright attack on the transcen-
dental. In other words, we are proposing that in responding to the
Julia and Mark incest scenario, our Malagasy informants would
be shifting away from a focus on two isolated individuals and the
emotions triggered by their action, to a consideration of what a
good society must be like. Their focus (including their emotional
reaction), would be on people’s need for the apparent imaginary
permanence of kinship, for the non-negotiable rules that protect
it. In other words, their overriding concern would be to restate
and reassure themselves that “for people to be people” society has
to be grounded in the transcendental.
We would like to suggest that the situation is not entirely
different for the students tested by Haidt and his colleagues. In
the experiment, the students were put in a situation in which
they had to decide, in complete isolation and away from any
meaningful social context, whether Julie and Mark’s action was
right or wrong. The reason they grew increasingly frustrated,
we suggest, is that they were forced to pretend that the moral
rules and concomitant emotions by which their social world is
created and lived by, are generated by the students themselves,
individually and on the grounds of having a good argument to
back them up.
Some might argue that bringing our ethnographic experience
of working in “holistic” communities in Madagascar to bear on
the interpretation of experimental results obtained in “individ-
ualistic” university campuses in North America is preposterous.
We do not think so. Even if there is no doubt that the students
in Haidt’s experiment have grown up in a society where individ-
ualism is rhetorically hegemonic, it is nonetheless the case that
they too must experience the social and its rules as originating
not in their personal deliberations or private emotions, but in
something that they can only grasp in the imagination. Provoked
by the experiment’s “devil’s advocate” into finding logical reasons
for their judgment, the students just gave up, since they know, or
perhaps feel, that their individual and isolated opinion is really
beside the point. Their dumbfoundedness signals that what they
are thinking and care about is the need to align themselves, jointly
with others, with what, ultimately and fundamentally, makes
people people, namely, the transcendental.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have made a strong case for the value of the
anthropological approach, showing what insights it can offer to
psychologists. By way of conclusion, we want to acknowledge
that the psychological approach has an important contribution
to make to the work of anthropologists—the two should be
brought into a fruitful dialectic relationship with each other.
Specifically, anthropologists are easily tempted to use isolated
bits of ethnographic evidence to reach doubtful psychological
generalizations about the cognitive characteristics of the people
they study. The use of psychological techniques and the awareness
of psychological findings can provide a useful corrective to the
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ease with which anthropologists reach conclusions about radical
cognitive differences. Here as in our previous work (e.g., Astuti,
2007b, 2009; Bloch, 2007, 2011; Astuti and Bloch, 2012), we hope
to have demonstrated the fruitfulness of combining concerns and
insights from both disciplines.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Eva Keller for drawing our attention to the
centrality of the concept “loza” for understanding incest in Mada-
gascar; Charles Stafford and Harry Walker for their comments on
an earlier draft.
REFERENCES
Astuti, R. (1995). People of the Sea: Identity and Descent Among the Vezo of
Madagascar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Astuti, R. (2007a). La moralité des conventions: tabous ancestraux à Madagascar.
Terrain 48, 101–112. doi: 10.4000/terrain.5041
Astuti, R. (2007b). “Ancestors and the afterlife,” in Religion, Anthropology, and
Cognitive Science, eds H. Whitehouse and J. Laidlaw (Chapel Hill, NC: Carolina
Academic Press), 161–178.
Astuti, R. (2009). “Revealing and obscuring Rivers’s pedigrees: biological inheri-
tance and kinship in Madagascar,” inKinship and Beyond: the GenealogicalModel
Reconsidered, eds J. Leach and S. Bamford (New York, NY: Berghahn), 214–236.
Astuti, R. and Bloch, M. (2012). Anthropologists as cognitive scientists. Top. Cogn.
Sci. 4, 453–461. doi:10.1111/j.1756-8765.2012.01191.x
Bloch, M. (1992). “What goes without saying: the conceptualization of Zafimaniry
society,” in Conceptualizing Society, ed. A. Kuper (London: Routledge), 127–146.
Bloch, M. (2007). “Durkheimian anthropology and religion: going in and out
of each other’s bodies,” in Religion, Anthropology, and Cognitive Science, eds.
H. Whitehouse and J. Laidlaw (Chapel Hill, NC: Carolina Academic Press),
63–80.
Bloch, M. (2008). Why religion is nothing special but is central. Philos. Trans. R. Soc.
B Biol. Sci. 363, 2055–2061. doi: 10.1098/rstb.2008.0007
Bloch, M. (2011). The Blob. Anthropology of this Century. Available at: http://
aotcpress.com/articles/blob [accessed August 9, 2014].
Danziger, E. (2006). “The thought that counts: interactional consequences of
variation in cultural theories of meaning,” in Roots of Human Sociality: Culture,
Cognition and Interaction, eds N. Enfield, J. Nicholas, and S. Levinson (Oxford:
Berg Press), 259–278.
Haidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail. Psychol. Rev. 108, 814–834.
doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.108.4.814
Rakoczy, H. (2008). Taking fiction seriously: young children understand the
normative structure of joint pretend games. Dev. Psychol. 44, 1195–1201. doi:
10.1037/0012-1649.44.4.1195
Walker, H. (2015). Justice and the Dark Arts: law and Shamanism in Amazonia.
Am. Anthropol. doi: 10.1111/aman.12170
Wolf, A. (2014). Incest Avoidance and the Incest Taboos: Two Aspects of Human
Nature. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wyman, E., and Rakoczy, H. (2011). “Social conventions, institutions and
human uniqueness: lessons from children and chimpanzees,” in Interdisciplinary
Anthropology, eds W. Welsch, W. Singer, and A. Wunder (Berlin: Springer-
Verlag), 131–156.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 09 August 2014; accepted: 26 January 2015; published online: 18 February
2015.
Citation: Astuti R and Bloch M (2015) The causal cognition of wrong doing: incest,
intentionality, and morality. Front. Psychol. 6:136. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00136
This article was submitted to Cognitive Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2015 Astuti and Bloch. This is an open-access article distributed under
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution
or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or
licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org February 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 136 | 7
